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The goal of MIX Discussion Paper Series is to disseminate the findings of work in 
progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about microfinance issues, and further 
exploit the wealth of data in MIX’s database.  It presents findings of empirical analysis, 
highlights research questions and areas for further exploration.  In order to get these 
findings out quickly, we will publish papers even if the presentation is less than fully 
polished.  The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are 
entirely those of the authors, and they do not represent necessarily the view of MIX or its 
board of Directors.   
 
Abstract 
 
After controlling for MFI and country characteristics, we find no evidence suggesting a 
strong (in magnitude) and statistically significant relationship between changes in GNI 
per capita (GROWTH) and four indicators of MFI portfolio risk: quality at Risk over 30 
Days (PAR-30), Portfolio at Risk over 90 Days (PAR-90), Loan loss Rate (LLR), and 
Write-off Ratio (WOR).  We test the robustness of the models with different 
specifications that confirm the general result and test for different impact from growth 
rates according to average loan sizes disbursed by MFIs. These tests suggest that 
microfinance portfolios have high resilience to economic shocks.  Specifically, we found 
only a significant relationship between growth and PAR-30.  We also control for other 
explanatory variables like size, age, average loan size, and productivity. 
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Introduction 
 
Microfinance is growing and is becoming a major component of most financial systems 
in developing countries.  The number of borrowers of the MFIs in this sample have been 
growing on average 17% per year in the period 1999-2005, with growth rates over 20% 
in the last two years.  Loan Portfolios in dollars have been growing on average 28% in 
the same period, with rates over 35% in the last two years.  In addition, many of these 
MFIs mobilize savings and are regulated by local superintendencies or central banks. 
 
As microfinance booms, local regulators get concerned about the impact of systemic 
shocks on MFIs performance, especially on their loan portfolios.  Funders and all types of 
investors also worry about losing their investments as economic conditions worsen in 
many countries.  Conventional wisdom and case studies5 have long pointed to the 
resilience of microfinance to macroeconomic shocks. To date, however, global studies 
analyzing these dynamics with panel data among large numbers of MFIs and countries 
have yet to appear6. 
 
In an attempt to fill this gap, we analyze MIX’s global MFI data set in search of 
quantitative evidence of impact of macroeconomic shocks and other variables on the 
quality of microfinance loan portfolios7.  Using panel regression we control for those 
observable variables that may have an impact on the quality of the portfolio, such as the 
size of an institution8, lending methodology, years of experience as a microcredit 
provider, its clients’ average loan balance, key factors in its cost structure, staff 
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than ours and they do not consider others explanatory variables in the analysis.  However, they compare 
correlations for MFIs and commercial banks for most performance variables in their analysis. 
Also, Ahlin, Christian, and Jocelyn Lin (2006), used a subsample of MIX Market data to evaluate the 
impact of macroeconomic events over MFIs performance. 
7
 We want to emphasis that the following analysis is not static pool analysis where data is analyzed at the 
loan level.  In our sample, all data is aggregated at the MFI level.  For an example of static pool analysis on 
microfinance, see Ayton, Rupert and Stephanie L. Sarver (2007). 
8
 We present results using Gross Loan Portfolio (GLP) as a proxy for size; however, results using 
borrowers instead of GLP were almost identical to the ones presented here. 
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productivity and salaries, and lending methodology.  In the country context, we look at 
inflation, commercial lending interest rate, and financial depth. 
 
The following analysis shows that after controlling for MFI and country characteristics, 
we find no evidence suggesting a strong (in magnitude) and statistically significant 
relationship between changes in GNI per capita (GROWTH) and four indicators of MFI 
portfolio quality: Portfolio at Risk over 30 Days (PAR-30), Portfolio at Risk over 90 
Days (PAR-90), Loan loss Rate (LLR), and Write-off Ratio (WOR).  We test the 
robustness of the models with different specifications that confirm the general results and 
test for different impacts from growth rates according to average loan size disbursed by 
MFIs. These tests suggest that microfinance portfolios have high resilience to economic 
shocks. 
 
This paper is organized in four more sections.  A general description of the sample and 
the discussion of many self-selection issues are discussed in section two.  The 
econometric estimation and discussion of the expected results are discussed in section 
three.  The main results of the paper are presented in section four, and conclusions are 
presented at the end. 
 
Sample Description 
 
The sample consists on 639 MFIs in 88 countries reporting data to the Microfinance 
Information Exchange, Inc. (MIX), mainly in the period 1999-2005, with eight MFIs 
reporting as early as 1996.  These MFIs represent 36 million borrowers with 13.7 billion 
USD in loan portfolio in 2005. 
 
There are self-selection issues that need to be discussed in order to understand the policy 
implications of the paper.  All MFIs in the sample have the ability to produce a minimum 
set of financial indicators, and the willingness to share private data with MIX (and very 
often with the world through their published profiles available at www.mixmarket.org).  
These two characteristics are not common to all MFIs in the world. 
 
The ability to disclose data is mostly related to the availability (at the MFI level) of 
adequate information systems, also used to monitor daily MFI operations, like 
disbursement and collection of loans.  MFIs that do not have the ability to report data to 
MIX, most likely do not have the best tools to monitor the quality of their portfolios.  
Also, since most MFIs in the sample have provided audited financial statements to be 
published with their public profiles, ability has to do as well with the capacity of 
providing all data necessary to satisfy the minimum requirements of auditing firms. 
 
But the willingness to share detailed financial information with MIX analysts and the 
world is driven by the potential exposure to investors and donors looking for investment 
opportunities among MFIs.  To be good investment opportunities, most MFIs reporting to 
MIX run their operations very efficiently and pay close attention, among other variables, 
to the portfolio quality and profitability of their operations.  Therefore, we expect that the 
MFIs in the sample are a random sample of the best MFIs in the world in terms of 
portfolio quality (among other variables), but definitely not a random sample of all MFIs. 
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Given the distinctive characteristics of MFIs in the sample, the high quality of their loan 
portfolios should not come as a surprise.  As shown in Table 1, average PAR-30 is just 
five percent, and the average value for any of the other three indicators of portfolio 
quality is below three percent.  In fact the average values are very close to the 75th 
percentile, meaning that only 25 percent of the observations in the sample have a PAR-30 
higher than six percent, or any of the other three indicators over three percent.  Looking 
at the results from a different angle, median PAR-30 is just three percent, and the median 
for the other variables is one percent. The high quality of most portfolios in the sample 
proves that for many MFIs in developing countries collection of small loans from 
informal microenterprenuers is not an issue. 
 
Empirical Approach 
 
We test the robustness of the results by estimating various econometric specifications for 
four different dependent variables: PAR-30, PAR-90, WOR and LLR.  The specific 
definition and source of all explanatory variables is presented in Appendix 1. 
 
It is important to highlight that only WOR and LLR are measures of default, while both 
PARs are measures of risk of default.  But given the high incentive that MFIs clients have 
to repay their loans and the effectiveness of MFIs collecting them, most late loans will be 
paid at some point.  For example, the average PAR-30 in the sample is five percent, but 
average LLR and WOR are three percent (Table 1).9 
 
Also, it is expected that PARs will be affected by very recent economic events, like this 
year’s growth, while this year’s WOR and LLR may be affected by last year’s growth, 
given the lag between arrears and MFIs writing off defaulted loans from their portfolios.  
Therefore, we try different econometric specifications using GROWTH and LAG 
GROWTH for arrears (PAR-30 and PAR-90) and defaults (LLR and WOR) respectively. 
 
In order to control for differences between lending methodologies, we include a set of 
dummy variables identifying Individual Lenders, Solidarity Groups, Village Banks and 
those MFIs with both Individual and Solidarity (IS) loans from Individual Lenders.  The 
results from these tests are very important from a policy perspective, because if they 
confirm the conventional wisdom that some lending methodologies are riskier than 
others, then microfinance supporters concerned about portfolio quality can identify the 
least risky lending methodologies. 
 
In order to test whether smaller loans are riskier than larger loans, we control for relative 
loan sizes as percentage of GNI per capita (LS/GNI).  Also we divide MFIs into three 
groups according to their relative loan size, and test whether the relationship between 
GROWTH (and its LAG) and portfolio risk changes by tercile.  Knowing if the resilience 
of MFIs varies by average loan size will help determine which loans are less resilient to 
local macroeconomic conditions. 
 
While actual client screening and portfolio monitoring cannot be measured, 
PRODUCTIVITY is included as a proxy for both.  For example, a low borrower to staff 
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ratio would suggest more time spent screening and monitoring borrowers than higher 
ratio.  We include AGE of the MFIs in order to control for differences in experienced 
lending and collection practices. 
 
Operating expense ratio (OE/GLP) captures differences between cost structures.  Also, as 
higher interest rates on loans may increase risk of default, we use nominal yields10 to 
control for higher risk typically associated with higher interest rates (adverse selection).  
Finally, various macroeconomic variables such as changes in price levels and depth of the 
financial system are analyzed to account for differences between countries. 
 
Results 
 
In Tables 3-4, we present all the different specifications tried under Fixed Effects (FE) 
for each of the four risk variables under analysis.  When looking at these results, it is 
important to remember the high correlation between PAR-30 and PAR-90 (86 percent, 
Table 2) and between WOR and LLR (99 percent).  As a result, regression results for 
arrears (PAR-30 and PAR-90) are similar as are those for measures of defaults (LLR and 
WOR). 
 
We test for Random Effects (RE) using the Hausman Specification Test in every model 
and reject the RE hypothesis on most of them.  In particular, we reject the RE hypothesis 
for all specifications for PAR-30 and PAR-9011.  For LLR, we could not reject the RE 
hypothesis in specification 1, and for WOR we could not reject the RE hypothesis for 
specifications 2 and 3.  The regression coefficients for LLR and WOR under RE are 
presented in Table 5. 
 
More important, there are not visible differences between the coefficients for GROWTH 
or LAG even when the RE hypothesis was not rejected.  However, the results for the 
impact of different lending methodologies vary between the RE and the FE results.  This 
is discussed later in the paper. 
 
Overall, we found that the coefficients for GROWTH (and its square) are significant only 
for PAR-30 and that their coefficients are very similar regardless of the sample used for 
the estimation (only MBB MFIs, specifications 1-2-3 versus MBB plus MIX Market 
MFIs, or specifications 1’-2’-3’).  Surprisingly, for none of the other three dependent 
variables did we find any significant relationship with GROWTH or LAG GROWTH 
(and their squares). 
 
In Figure 1 we show that the predicted relationship between GROWTH and PAR-30 is 
not very strong.  For example, a drop in GROWTH from 9 percent (average in the 
sample, indicated in the graph with dotted line) to -10 percent (below 10th percentile) will 
produce an average increase in PAR-30 of only two percentage points. The result is very 
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consistent over samples for the specification where MFIs are not divided by loan size (1 
and 1’). 
 
Figure 1:  Predicted Effects for GROWTH 
PAR-30 versus GROWTH
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Interestingly, these predictions also suggest that PAR-30 will reach its minimum level 
somewhere between 15-17 percent of GROWTH (depending on the specification used), 
and once local economies grow faster than this range it would not be surprising to 
observe small increases in PAR-30.  This is consistent with MFIs taking more risks when 
economic conditions are favorable for their operations.  However, the regression results 
suggest no relationship with PAR-90, LLR and WOR. 
 
Our interpretation of these results is that when economic conditions become less 
favorable for MFIs, they experience a small deterioration in short term repayment 
(increases in PAR-30), but also succeed in collecting most of their loans, so that in the 
end, we do not observe any statistically significant relationship between either LLR or 
WOR and GROWTH.  In the same way, when economic conditions are more favorable 
for MFIs they are willing to increase the risk of their portfolios, and do so without 
deteriorating the overall quality of their portfolios as measure by LLR and WOR. 
 
It is important to highlight that these results do not imply that very low or negative 
growth is not harmful for MFIs.  It is expected that as PAR-30 increases when GROWTH 
goes down, MFIs need to allocate more of their resources to monitor and collect 
delinquent loans in order to guarantee their repayment.  Most likely, this will result in an 
increase in costs that needs to be compensated with lower profits or higher interest rates.  
Also, it is expected that more prudent MFIs will adjust their growth targets if they 
perceive that PARs are going up, and negative economic conditions will persist for a 
longer periods in order to control the quality of their portfolios. 
 
 7 
Figure 2:  Predicted Effects for GROWTH by Target Market 
PAR-30 versus GROWTH by Terciles
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Breaking MFIs into three groups according to relative loan sizes (LS/GNI), and 
estimating three different coefficients for GROWTH did not change the general result 
regarding GROWTH and portfolio quality that is that only PAR-30 exhibits statistically 
significant relationships with GROWTH, but not PAR-90, LLR and WOR.  However, as 
shown in Figure 2, this analysis also suggests that compared to their average level12, 
PAR-30 of MFIs disbursing smaller loans (1st Tercile) will improve more with higher 
growth than the predicted improvements in PAR-30 for MFIs in the 2nd and 3rd Terciles.  
Also compared to their average levels, MFIs in the 2nd Tercile will experienced the worst 
deterioration in PAR-30 with lower growth compared to the deteriorations predicted for 
the 1st and 3rd Terciles. 
 
The fact that MFIs in the 1st Tercile do not exhibit the worst deterioration in PAR-30 
when economic conditions weaken is a surprising results given the common association 
between loan size and income level of the borrowers, and suggests that poorer borrowers 
are not the ones that suffer more when growth is low or negative.  One alternative 
explanation, that we cannot test here, is that for poorer borrower repaying their loan is so 
important, that they will not repay late, even when overall economic conditions are bad.  
However, given that we could not find any significant relationship with any other 
dependent variable when breaking MFIs into terciles by relative loan size also suggests 
that independent of the loan size (and income level of the borrowers), MFIs manage to 
keep repayment rates high when growth is low or negative. 
 
Ahlin and Lin (2006) did not find any significant result between portfolio quality (WOR 
and PAR-30) and growth in their fixed effect results, and they report significant effects 
between these variables for their between results and pooled results.  Based on our results 
we know that fixed effects results are better than random effect ones, and ignoring them 
may result in biased results, but such tests are not available in Ahlin and Lin (2006). 
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A frequent source of debate between microfinance practitioners is whether solidarity 
groups are less risky than individual loans13.  Some theoretical models support this 
position, arguing that repayment is higher because groups provide incentives for peers to 
screen, monitor and enforce each other’s loans, especially when one member of the group 
has suffered a shock.  While this holds for idiosyncratic shocks, systemic shocks like the 
ones under analysis here would be expected to induce more generalized defaults among 
group members. 
 
In our model, we control for differences in lending methodologies with dummy variables 
for Solidarity Groups (SOLIDARITY), Village Banks (VILLAGE), and both Individual-
Solidarity Groups (IS)14.  Compared to Individual Lenders, our results show that Village 
Banks have a PAR-30 over three percentage points higher, and a PAR-90 two percentage 
points higher.  Also compared to Individual Lenders, these results show that Solidarity 
Groups have a PAR-90 over one percentage point higher, and that ISs have a PAR-30 
over one percentage point higher15. 
 
The evidence on the relationship between lending methodologies and both LLR and 
WOR is not that robust (Table 4).  In all estimations under FE none of the coefficients 
associated with lending methodologies was statistically significant, and their absolute 
value was less than half a percentage point.  However, we could not reject RE for two 
specifications of LLR (2-3) and one of WOR (3).  Overall, this suggests that FE is the 
best estimation for all dependent variables with the exception of LLR, and that there is no 
statistically significant relationship between lending methodology and PAR-30, PAR-90 
and WOR.   However, in two of the specifications for LLR where we did not reject FE 
(2-3) we found evidence that compared to Individual Lenders, Solidarity Groups have a 
LLR 1.3-1.4 percentage points lower and Village Banks have a LLR 1.6 percentage 
points lower.16 
 
PAR-30 is the only dependent variable for which it is possible to estimate regressions 
using both MIX Market and MBB data.  The coefficients for ONLYMM suggests that 
MFIs that report only to MIX Market have an average PAR-30 over 1.2-1.5 percentage 
points higher than those MFIs that report only to MBB or to both databases.  Also, 
combining both samples we found that Licensed MFIs have a PAR-30 five percentage 
points higher than other MFIs17, but no significant difference regarding the other 
dependent variables. 
 
Regarding size, we found that larger MFIs, both in terms of larger loan sizes and larger 
loan portfolios are not riskier than smaller MFIs.  In particular, we did not find any 
significant relationship between loans size and any of the four measures of portfolio 
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 For example, see the discussion on the topic in Development Finance discussion group between July-
August 2006. 
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 The omitted variable is INDIVIDUAL. 
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 In addition, this results show that regarding PARs, ISs and Solidarity Groups are very similar. 
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 Gine, Xavier and Dean Karlan (2006) found no difference in repayment between members of groups that 
were randomly assigned to individual loans in a control experiment.  Additional references and discussion 
can be found in chapter 4 of Armendáriz de Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch (2005). 
17
  We did not control for type of MFIs for the other three dependent variables at the present time. 
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quality under analysis. For GLP (Figure 3), we found only one significant relationship 
with PAR-30 in all three specifications that use only MBB data.  However, running 
similar regressions with the combined sample did not result in significant results for GLP. 
 
Figure 3:  Predicted Effect for GLP 
PAR-30 versus GLP
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We found that on average older MFIs tend to have lower PARs and higher LLR and 
WOR (See Figure 4).  These results are not inconsistent with each other once you 
consider that we have a sample with many young MFIs (25 percent are five years old or 
less) that do not accumulate write-offs during their first years of operations, especially 
when compared to their growing loan portfolios. As MFIs get older we will expect higher 
LLR and WOR, but less PARs as lending methodologies and collection practices 
improve, as illustrated by the declining spread between predicted PAR-30 and PAR-90. 
 
Figure 4: Predicted Effect for AGE 
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In Figure 4, we draw each predicted curved at its sample average.  According to these 
predictions, a 20 year old MFI will have an average LLR and WOR one percentage point 
higher, a PAR-30 over one percentage point lower, and a PAR-90 less than one 
percentage point lower than a ten year old MFI.  However, given than less than 10 
percent of the sample is over 20 years old, it is likely that these results will be adjusted as 
the sample ages. 
 
We found that more productive MFIs have lower PAR-30 and did not find any significant 
effect on the other three dependent variables.  This means that with the right lending and 
collection practices it is possible to improve productivity without sacrificing portfolio 
quality.  However, as shown in Figure 5, we found that the relationship between 
productivity and PAR-30 change direction once productivity reaches somewhere between 
340-400 borrowers per staff depending on the specification used.  After this point 
increases in productivity may increase PAR because the ability of staff to screen and 
monitor borrowers get compromised. 
 
Figure 5: Predicted Effect for PRODUCTIVITY 
PAR-30 versus PRODUCTIVITY
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The coefficients for OE/GLP show a positive relationship with WOR and a negative 
relationship with PAR-30, meaning that more efficient MFIs tend to have lower WOR 
and higher PAR-30 (Figure 6).  Remember that we did not find any significant 
relationship with relative loan size of any of these variables and that PRODUCTIVITY 
was significant only for PAR-30.  Therefore, our interpretation of this apparently 
inconsistent results is that efficiency gains come from MFIs using lending methodologies 
that care less about short term repayment problems (so that PAR-30 increases), but that 
guarantee the ultimate repayment of most loans at collection. 
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Figure 6: Predicted Effect for OE/GLP 
PAR-30 and WOR versus OE/GLP
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We also control for the percentage of assets that MFIs allocate as loan portfolio.  Young 
MFIs and fast growing MFIs tend to have higher reserves (idle assets) to finance their 
future growth than mature MFIs or MFIs with limited access to external resources.  In 
Figure 7, we plot the predicted relationship between both PARs and GLP/ASSETS.  The 
average GLP/ASSETS is 72 percent and the extremes of the horizontal scale correspond 
to the 10th and 90th percentiles. 
 
Figure 7: Predicted Effect for GLP/ASSETS 
PAR-30 and PAR-90 versus GLP/ASSETS
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According to this prediction, PARs increase as MFIs improve the share of their assets 
allocated to GLP.  However, we did not find any significant relationship for LLR and 
WOR.  This means that MFIs onto the right of the average are those that are willing to let 
PARs run a little bit higher without sacrificing overall portfolio quality.  For these MFIs 
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the efficiency gains from maximizing the percentage of assets as GLP compensate the 
extra effort necessary to guarantee the repayment of their loans, even when PARs go up. 
 
Finally, we did not find any statistically significant relationship between YIELD and any 
proxy of arrears (LLR and WOR).  We only found one significant relationship between 
PAR-30 and YIELD using the combined sample.  However the magnitude of the 
coefficient is almost zero and the sign is not what we would have expected (Figure 8).  
This result may be surprising to many because it suggest that overall the MFIs in the 
sample succeed in mitigating any adverse selection effect from charging higher interest 
rates.  In a similar analysis, Cull et. al. (2006), found a significant relationship between 
PAR-30 and real yields only for Individual MFIs and with a cross section of 124 MFIs.  
 
Figure 8: Predicted Effect for YIELD. 
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Testing for commitment to sustainability 
 
In an attempt to measure the commitment to sustainability of an MFI’s management, we 
included a dummy variable (SUSTAINABLE) set to 1 for all MFIs that had positive 
returns the previous year, and 0 otherwise (Tables 6-8).  We found that previously 
sustainable MFIs have a PAR-30 almost 1 percentage point higher.  However, we also 
found that these MFIs have a WOR and LLR 0.6 percentage points lower than other 
MFIs.  For all other explanatory variables, the general result is that less of them are 
significant.  This result confirms that unobservable MFI characteristics play an important 
role on the overall performance of MFIs. 
 
We also test whether the duration of a crisis has any impact on portfolio quality.  For that, 
we run a full analysis replacing GROWTH with the cumulative growth of the last two 
and three years (or LAG with the cumulative LAG of the previous two and three years).  
For all specifications and dependent variables, we did not find any improvement in 
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goodness of fit, changes in the significance of the coefficients, or relevant differences in 
the magnitude of significant coefficients.18 
 
Conclusions 
 
Microloans resilient to macroeconomic changes 
Our estimates show no relationship between changes in GNI per capita and asset quality.  
Specifically, regression results show no statistically significant relationship between 
GROWTH (and its lag) and PAR-90, LLR and WOR.  In all specifications for these 
dependent variables, the coefficients associated with GROWTH (or its lag) were not 
statistically significant, even when estimating different impacts according to relative loan 
size.  In short, economic crises showed up in increased delinquency, but not in eventual 
default.  Assets were stressed, but not unrecoverable. 
 
Overall, this analysis shows that there are many unobserved variables that are important 
for explaining variability of portfolio risk.  This result is not surprising.  Industry analysts 
have long argued that the most important factors determining the risk in an MFI’s 
portfolio are related to their management and human resources, quality of MIS, 
governance, credit policies, mission and commitment to sustainability.  Similarly, other 
factors such as poor market infrastructure (e.g. lack of roads or remoteness) or other 
factors affecting the client population (e.g. long term poor health conditions due poor 
sanitary conditions or widespread chronic illness like HIV/AIDS) may impact repayment. 
These are all very important factors but ones for which no consistent, reliable data exist 
on a significant scale.  With the exception of commitment to sustainability, none of these 
are specifically incorporated into the current analysis. 
 
What have we learned? 
Data available for modeling the risk of MFI portfolios are limited.  Despite the breadth of 
data available through MIX data sets, the explanatory power of existing variables is 
limited.  The data themselves also pose challenges.  Little variability in portfolio risk and 
loss exists among MFIs reporting to MIX.  On one end, an MFI never improves risk or 
loss beyond zero percent.  On the other end, MFIs that report data to MIX are more 
transparent, have basic reporting systems to capture and report on key financial and 
operational statistics, and are hence more likely to use and act upon the information to 
prevent crises, including repayment crises, within their institutions.  As a result, where 
there exists a notional maximum risk or loss of 100 percent, reported results lie mostly in 
a tight range between zero and six percent. 
 
The analysis still holds important lessons for investors looking to bundle and sell 
securities backed by microloan portfolios or buy the microloan portfolios themselves.  
Evidence to date would indicate that the quality of such assets stands up to economic 
downturns.  Our model finds nothing significant to suggest otherwise.  However, given 
the importance of other factors such as management and governance, business processes, 
and product design and the likelihood that they influence portfolio risk, this analysis 
suggests that the quality of the originator of those loans matters even more than the 
downturns in the economic environment in which the microborrowers operate.  Even 
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when buying microloan portfolios, choosing the right partner MFI is still the best 
guarantee of success. 
 
Finally, this analysis does not suggest that systemic macroeconomic shocks are not 
harmful at all for MFIs.  Additional research needs to be done to understand the impact of 
economic downturns on growth, cost and profitability of MFIs.  Also, future research 
should consider better estimation techniques that allow for heteroskedasticty in the data, 
among other potential problems. 
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Appendix 1: Dependent and Explanatory variables 
 
Not all explanatory and dependent variables are available for the full sample as some are 
only reported to the MicroBanking Bulletin.  Descriptive statistics for all Dependent and 
Explanatory variables are presented in Table 1 and correlation coefficients in Table 2. 
 
Dependent variables 
Out of the four dependent variables, only PAR-90 and LLR are not available to MFIs 
reporting only to MIX Market.  In addition, given that many MFIs reporting only to MIX 
Market do not have an standard policy about write-offs –some of them never write-off 
defaulted loans--, for this dependent variable we will analyze only  MFIs with adjusted 
data, where MIX analyst have standardized write-offs for all MFIs in sample following 
standards policies. 
 PAR-30 : Outstanding balance, loans overdue >30 Days / Gross Loan Portfolio 
 PAR-90: Outstanding balance, loans overdue >90 Days / Gross Loan Portfolio 
 WOR: Value of loans written-off / Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
 LLR: Write-offs, net of recoveries/ Average Gross Loan Portfolio 
 
Explanatory variables 
Not available in MIX Market 
 INDIVIDUAL: 1 if lending methodology is individual, 0 otherwise.  This is the 
omitted variable. 
 SOLIDARITY GROUPS: 1 if lending methodology is solidarity groups, 0 otherwise 
 VILLAGE BANKS: 1 if lending methodology is village banks, 0 otherwise 
 IS: 1 if lending methodology is both individual and solidarity groups, 0 otherwise 
 
Available in both MIX Market and MBB 
 LICENSED: 1 if charter is Bank or Non Bank Financial Institution (NBFI), 0 
otherwise 
 ONLYMM:  1 if observation is from MIX Market only, 0 otherwise 
 LS/GNI per capita: Average loan size per borrower / GNI per capita 
 SUSTAINABLE:  1 if ROA>=0 in previous year, 0 otherwise 
 AGE: LOG19 of  Number of years since establishment 
 PRODUCTIVITY: Average number of borrowers per staff 
 GLP: Gross Loan Portfolio in million dollars, proxy of size 
 OE/GLP: Operating Expense / Average GLP 
 GLP/ASSETS: GLP / Assets 
 YIELD/GLP: Yield / GLP 
 
Macroeconomic variables from World Development Indicators, various years 
 LENDING RATE:  Bank rate that usually meets the short and medium term financing 
needs of the private sector. 
 FINANCIAL DEPTH: Liquid liabilities (M3) / GDP.  
 INFLATION: Changes in consumer prices. 
 GROWTH:  Growth rate of GNI per capita. 
 LAG GROWTH: 1 period Lag of GROWTH 
                                                 
19
 Natural Logarithm computed with ln() using Stata. 
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 GROWTH1: GROWTH if LS/GNI in first tercile, 0 otherwise 
 GROWTH2: GROWTH if LS/GNI in second tercile, 0 otherwise 
 GROWTH3: GROWTH if LS/GNI in third tercile, 0 otherwise 
 LAG GROWTH1: LAG GROWTH if LS/GNI in first tercile, 0 otherwise 
 LAG GROWTH2: LAG GROWTH if LS/GNI in second tercile, 0 otherwise 
 LAG GROWTH3: LAG GROWTH if LS/GNI in third tercile, 0 otherwise 
 EAP, EECA, LAC, MENA, S ASIA and SS AFRICA, regional dummies for East 
Asia and Pacific, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America, South Asia, and 
Sub-Saharan Africa respectively.  SS Africa is the omitted dummy variable. 
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Table 1: Means and Percentiles of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
   Percentiles 
 Sample Mean P10 P20 P25 P40 P45 P50 P55 P60 P75 P80 P90 
PAR-30  2439 5.2 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 6 7 13 
PAR-90 1431 2.3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 6 
WOR 1432 3.0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 7 
LLR 1432 2.7 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 3 3 6 
INDIVIDUAL 1432 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
SOLIDARITY 1432 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
VILLAGE BANKS 1432 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
IS 2440 0.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
LICENSED 2440 0.4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
LS/GNI PER CAPITA 2440 74.3 8 14 16 25 30 36 42 49 78 94 157 
SUSTAINABLE 1572 0.6 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
PRODUCTIVITY 2394 132.7 36 59 68 93 101 111 122 131 169 188 237 
AGE 2437 9.7 3 4 5 6 7 8 8 9 13 14 19 
OE/GLP 2429 35.2 10 13 15 19 21 23 26 28 40 46 65 
GLP 2440 15.9 0 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 7 10 25 
GLP/ASSETS 2440 71.9 46 58 62 71 73 75 77 80 85 87 92 
YIELD/GLP 2434 56.6 18 22 23 29 30 33 35 38 48 52 65 
FINANCIAL DEPTH 2373 40.3 20 24 26 32 33 36 40 41 50 54 64 
LENDING RATE 2034 17.9 9 11 11 14 14 15 16 17 20 23 29 
INFLATION 2431 8.2 2 2 3 4 5 6 6 7 9 10 13 
GROWTH 2440 9.2 -4 0 3 7 8 9 10 11 15 17 23 
LAG GROWTH 2440 6.5 -6 -2 0 3 4 5 6 8 13 15 20 
GROWTH_1 781 7.6 -4 2 3 6 7 8 9 10 13 14 18 
GROWTH_2 764 10.1 -4 3 4 8 9 10 11 13 15 18 23 
GROWTH_3 763 11.4 -3 3 4 9 10 11 13 14 18 20 27 
LAG GROWTH_1 748 5.9 -6 -3 0 5 5 5 6 9 11 13 19 
LAG GROWTH_2 742 7.5 -6 -2 2 5 6 7 8 9 14 17 22 
LAG GROWTH_3 742 8.1 -7 -3 -1 4 5 7 9 10 17 18 23 
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Table 2: Correlations between Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
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PAR 30 1.0
PAR 90 0.9 1.0
WOR 0.3 0.4 1.0
LLR 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.0
INDIVIDUAL 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
SOLIDARITY -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 1.0
VILLAGE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.1 1.0
IS 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 1.0
LICENSED -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 1.0
LS % GNI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 1.0
PRODUCTIVITY -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 1.0
AGE 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 0.1 1.0
OE % GLP 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.2 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 1.0
GLP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 1.0
GLP % ASSETS -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 -0.4 0.0 1.0
Y % GLP 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 1.0
FINANCIAL DEPTH -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
LENDING RATE 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.0 -0.1 0.0 -0.2 1.0
INFLATION 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0
GROWTH -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 -0.1 1.0
LAG GROWTH -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.7 1.0
 
 
 
 20 
Table 3: Dependent Variables: PAR-30 and PAR-90.  Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable PAR-30 PAR-90 
Specification 1 2 3 1' 2' 3' 1 2 3 
GROWTH -0.095   -0.102   -0.030   
 [0.00]***   [0.00]***   [0.14]   
GROWTH_S 0.003   0.003   0.001   
 [0.01]**   [0.00]***   [0.23]   
L0Growth_1  -0.100 -0.062  -0.093 -0.075  -0.058 -0.035 
  [0.08]* [0.09]*  [0.03]** [0.05]**  [0.15] [0.18] 
L0Growth_1_S  0.003 0.000  0.002 0.000  0.002 0.000 
  [0.35] [.]  [0.38] [.]  [0.45] [.] 
L0Growth_2  -0.142 -0.059  -0.152 -0.068  -0.028 -0.004 
  [0.00]*** [0.02]**  [0.00]*** [0.03]**  [0.33] [0.83] 
L0Growth_2_S  0.004 0.000  0.004 0.000  0.001 0.000 
  [0.01]*** [.]  [0.02]** [.]  [0.27] [.] 
L0Growth_3  -0.026 -0.013  -0.086 -0.006  -0.007 -0.009 
  [0.57] [0.62]  [0.05]* [0.83]  [0.82] [0.64] 
L0Growth_3_S  0.001 0.000  0.004 0.000  0.000 0.000 
  [0.68] [.]  [0.01]** [.]  [0.99] [.] 
Solidarity Groups 1.208 1.230 1.243    1.240 1.230 1.246 
 [0.19] [0.19] [0.18]    [0.06]* [0.07]* [0.06]* 
Village Banks 3.066 3.065 3.012    2.332 2.275 2.275 
 [0.00]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]***    [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
IS 1.204 1.184 1.190    0.770 0.751 0.759 
 [0.08]* [0.09]* [0.09]*    [0.12] [0.13] [0.13] 
ONLYMIX    1.172 1.118 1.233    
    [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.01]**    
Licensed    5.225 5.088 4.833    
    [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.02]**    
LS_G 0.003 0.000 -0.004 -0.010 -0.011 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 
 [0.82] [0.97] [0.77] [0.31] [0.24] [0.23] [0.27] [0.30] [0.25] 
LS_G_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.51] [0.40] [0.28] [0.37] [0.29] [0.33] [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]** 
GLP_M 0.019 0.020 0.018 0.007 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 [0.01]*** [0.00]*** [0.01]** [0.48] [0.40] [0.60] [0.34] [0.35] [0.42] 
GLP_M_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.07]* [0.06]* [0.08]* [0.84] [0.77] [0.95] [0.66] [0.68] [0.74] 
Age -2.052 -2.163 -2.019 -0.664 -0.543 -0.447 -0.882 -0.921 -0.880 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.01]*** [0.36] [0.46] [0.54] [0.09]* [0.08]* [0.09]* 
Productivity -0.019 -0.020 -0.022 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
 [0.04]** [0.03]** [0.02]** [0.24] [0.26] [0.31] [0.25] [0.26] [0.23] 
Productivity^2 0.00003 0.00003 0.00003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.09]* [0.07]* [0.05]* [0.58] [0.56] [0.66] [0.33] [0.33] [0.29] 
OE_GLP -0.057 -0.059 -0.071 -0.042 -0.042 -0.040 -0.026 -0.027 -0.030 
 [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.01]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.17] [0.16] [0.11] 
OE_GLP_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.49] [0.48] [0.24] [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]** [0.82] [0.79] [0.64] 
GLP/ASSETS -0.177 -0.179 -0.190 -0.372 -0.373 -0.375 -0.211 -0.214 -0.217 
 [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
GLP/ASSETS^2 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
Y_GLP 0.036 0.041 0.042 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.022 0.023 0.024 
 [0.47] [0.41] [0.40] [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.04]** [0.54] [0.51] [0.50] 
Y_GLP_2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0000001 0.0000001 0.0000001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.49] [0.54] [0.51] [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.58] [0.59] [0.57] 
FD 0.061 0.063 0.057 0.031 0.031 0.029 0.019 0.021 0.020 
 [0.04]** [0.04]** [0.06]* [0.39] [0.40] [0.43] [0.36] [0.33] [0.35] 
LENDING RATE 0.015 0.009 0.012 0.021 0.030 0.035 0.006 0.004 0.006 
 [0.60] [0.76] [0.68] [0.35] [0.22] [0.11] [0.76] [0.83] [0.78] 
inflation 0.011 0.014 0.023 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 0.003 0.005 0.007 
 [0.68] [0.60] [0.39] [0.34] [0.30] [0.30] [0.89] [0.81] [0.72] 
Constant 10.100 10.530 11.440 15.540 15.370 15.220 8.552 8.578 8.806 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
Observations 1183 1183 1183 1959 1959 1959 1183 1183 1183 
Number of id 434 434 434 639 639 639 434 434 434 
R2_O 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
R2_W 10% 11% 10% 8% 9% 8% 9% 9% 9% 
R2_B 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 4% 4% 3% 
Chi2 50.71 54.11 44.26 48.27 52 35.13 41.44 43.89 33.82 
Prob>Chi2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
p values in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. H0: difference in coefficients not systematic 
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Table 4: Dependent Variables: LLR and WOR.  Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable LLR WOR 
Specification 1 2 3 1 2 3 
LAGGROWTH -0.023   -0.021   
 [0.20]   [0.25]   
LAGGROWTH_S 0.001   0.001   
 [0.41]   [0.42]   
LAGGROWTH_1  -0.031 0.000  -0.027 0.003 
  [0.40] [1.00]  [0.49] [0.92] 
LAGGROWTH_1_S  0.003 0.000  0.003 0.000 
  [0.21] [.]  [0.25] [.] 
LAGGROWTH_2  -0.027 -0.017  -0.024 -0.012 
  [0.26] [0.36]  [0.33] [0.53] 
LAGGROWTH_2_S  0.001 0.000  0.001 0.000 
  [0.48] [.]  [0.43] [.] 
LAGGROWTH_3  -0.006 -0.019  -0.005 -0.024 
  [0.86] [0.39]  [0.90] [0.30] 
LAGGROWTH_3_S  -0.001 0.000  -0.001 0.000 
  [0.70] [.]  [0.57] [.] 
SOLIDARITY  -0.503 -0.506 -0.465 -0.411 -0.409 -0.380 
 [0.50] [0.50] [0.53] [0.59] [0.60] [0.62] 
VILLAGE BANKS -0.574 -0.591 -0.511 -0.761 -0.767 -0.698 
 [0.50] [0.50] [0.55] [0.39] [0.39] [0.44] 
IS 0.455 0.448 0.480 0.426 0.425 0.453 
 [0.41] [0.42] [0.38] [0.45] [0.46] [0.43] 
LS/GNI -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 [0.91] [0.85] [0.84] [0.96] [0.99] [0.99] 
LS/GNI_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.68] [0.71] [0.72] [0.57] [0.58] [0.59] 
GLP_M 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 [0.63] [0.58] [0.62] [0.68] [0.63] [0.69] 
GLP_M_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.59] [0.56] [0.55] [0.62] [0.59] [0.58] 
AGE 1.605 1.586 1.638 2.065 2.048 2.106 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
PRODUCTIVITY -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.90] [0.82] [0.85] [0.87] [0.82] [0.84] 
PRODUCTIVITY_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.89] [0.95] [0.93] [0.90] [0.94] [0.93] 
OE/GLP 0.027 0.028 0.028 0.044 0.046 0.046 
 [0.20] [0.18] [0.18] [0.04]** [0.04]** [0.04]** 
OE/GLP_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.31] [0.29] [0.29] [0.12] [0.11] [0.10] 
GLP/ASSETS 0.050 0.053 0.052 0.079 0.083 0.081 
 [0.37] [0.34] [0.35] [0.17] [0.15] [0.16] 
GLP/ASSETS_S -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.06]* [0.06]* [0.06]* [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]** 
YIELD/GLP -0.039 -0.041 -0.042 -0.028 -0.031 -0.032 
 [0.33] [0.31] [0.29] [0.50] [0.45] [0.43] 
YIELD/GLP_2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.32] [0.31] [0.30] [0.50] [0.48] [0.46] 
FD -0.016 -0.016 -0.012 -0.016 -0.016 -0.012 
 [0.51] [0.51] [0.61] [0.52] [0.52] [0.61] 
LENDING RATE 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.001 -0.003 0.001 
 [0.74] [0.84] [0.74] [0.97] [0.91] [0.96] 
INFLATION -0.005 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.005 0.004 
 [0.80] [0.93] [0.94] [0.98] [0.83] [0.85] 
Constant 0.469 0.539 0.296 -1.688 -1.669 -1.896 
 [0.87] [0.85] [0.92] [0.56] [0.57] [0.52] 
Observations 1184 1184 1184 1184 1184 1184 
Number of id 434 434 434 434 434 434 
R2_O 4% 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
R2_W 6% 7% 6% 8% 8% 8% 
R2_B 6% 6% 6% 7% 7% 7% 
Chi2 22.24 25.67 19.21 25.13 27.93 21.50 
Prob>Chi2 10% 14% 26% 5% 8% 16% 
p values in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. H0: difference in coefficients not systematic 
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Table 5: Dependent Variables: LLR and WOR.  Random Effects 
Dependent Variable LLR WOR 
Specification 1 2 3 1 2 3 
LAGGROWTH -0.018   -0.017   
 [0.27]   [0.31]   
LAGGROWTH_S 0.000   0.000   
 [0.98]   [0.99]   
LAGGROWTH_1  -0.013 -0.006  -0.008 -0.001 
  [0.69] [0.79]  [0.83] [0.96] 
LAGGROWTH_1_S  0.001   0.001  
  [0.77]   [0.80]  
LAGGROWTH_2  -0.022 -0.019  -0.021 -0.017 
  [0.32] [0.24]  [0.35] [0.32] 
LAGGROWTH_2_S  0.000   0.000  
  [0.88]   [0.79]  
LAGGROWTH_3  -0.013 -0.024  -0.012 -0.029 
  [0.70] [0.21]  [0.74] [0.14] 
LAGGROWTH_3_S  -0.001   -0.001  
  [0.68]   [0.54]  
SOLIDARITY  -1.329 -1.349 -1.346 -1.226 -1.254 -1.256 
 [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.04]** [0.03]** [0.03]** 
VILLAGE BANKS -1.616 -1.640 -1.624 -1.763 -1.791 -1.776 
 [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
IS 0.104 0.090 0.098 0.170 0.152 0.161 
 [0.79] [0.82] [0.80] [0.67] [0.70] [0.69] 
LS/GNI -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.007 
 [0.23] [0.30] [0.29] [0.28] [0.41] [0.39] 
LS/GNI_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.71] [0.80] [0.79] [0.68] [0.83] [0.81] 
GLP_M -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.83] [0.85] [0.84] [0.99] [0.98] [1.00] 
GLP_M_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [1.00] [0.99] [0.99] [0.85] [0.84] [0.83] 
AGE 0.978 0.974 0.985 1.195 1.189 1.204 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
PRODUCTIVITY -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.34] [0.34] [0.34] [0.33] [0.34] [0.34] 
PRODUCTIVITY_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.49] [0.48] [0.48] [0.46] [0.47] [0.47] 
OE/GLP 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.052 0.053 0.053 
 [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
OE/GLP_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.04]** [0.04]** [0.04]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** 
GLP/ASSETS 0.030 0.031 0.031 0.044 0.045 0.045 
 [0.53] [0.52] [0.52] [0.37] [0.36] [0.36] 
GLP/ASSETS_S -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [0.10] [0.10] [0.10]* [0.06]* [0.06]* [0.06]* 
YIELD/GLP -0.031 -0.032 -0.033 -0.037 -0.038 -0.039 
 [0.13] [0.12] [0.12] [0.09]* [0.08]* [0.07]* 
YIELD/GLP_2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.35] [0.36] [0.34] [0.24] [0.23] [0.22] 
FD 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 [0.21] [0.21] [0.21] [0.20] [0.20] [0.20] 
LENDING RATE -0.015 -0.016 -0.014 -0.019 -0.021 -0.018 
 [0.36] [0.34] [0.38] [0.26] [0.24] [0.28] 
INFLATION -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001 
 [0.93] [0.97] [0.92] [0.93] [0.87] [0.95] 
R_EAP -0.534 -0.546 -0.537 -0.508 -0.521 -0.504 
 [0.55] [0.54] [0.54] [0.58] [0.57] [0.58] 
R_EECA -0.605 -0.552 -0.558 -0.197 -0.109 -0.125 
 [0.49] [0.53] [0.53] [0.83] [0.90] [0.89] 
R_LAC -0.319 -0.341 -0.334 0.005 -0.018 -0.011 
 [0.69] [0.67] [0.67] [0.99] [0.98] [0.99] 
R_MENA -2.752 -2.753 -2.731 -2.627 -2.628 -2.595 
 [0.07]* [0.07]* [0.07]* [0.09]* [0.10]* [0.10]* 
R_SASIA 0.031 -0.089 -0.063 0.179 0.021 0.055 
 [0.98] [0.93] [0.95] [0.87] [0.98] [0.96] 
Constant 2.821 2.812 2.771 1.834 1.793 1.742 
 [0.20] [0.20] [0.21] [0.42] [0.43] [0.44] 
R2_O 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 
R2_W 5% 5% 5% 7% 7% 7% 
R2_B 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 12% 
p values in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 6: Dependent Variables: PAR-30 and PAR-90.  Fixed Effects 
 PAR-30 PAR-90 
Specification 1 2 3 1' 2' 3' 1 2 3 
SUSTAINABLE -0.091 -0.078 -0.116 0.833 0.846 0.860 -0.015 -0.003 -0.034 
 [0.80] [0.83] [0.75] [0.08]* [0.07]* [0.07]* [0.95] [0.99] [0.89] 
GROWTH -0.044   -0.110   -0.027   
 [0.18]   [0.01]**   [0.23]   
GROWTH_S 0.002   0.006   0.001   
 [0.08]*   [0.00]***   [0.18]   
GROWTH_1  -0.097 -0.039  -0.057 -0.025  -0.071 -0.028 
  [0.08]* [0.28]  [0.37] [0.58]  [0.07]* [0.26] 
GROWTH_1_S  0.004 0.000  0.002 0.000  0.003 0.000 
  [0.15] [.]  [0.54] [.]  [0.14] [.] 
GROWTH_2  -0.128 -0.040  -0.253 -0.064  -0.034 -0.009 
  [0.01]*** [0.15]  [0.00]*** [0.09]*  [0.29] [0.63] 
GROWTH_2_S  0.004 0.000  0.010 0.000  0.001 0.000 
  [0.01]** [.]  [0.00]*** [.]  [0.31] [.] 
GROWTH_3  0.110 0.063  -0.021 0.100  0.022 0.016 
  [0.04]** [0.03]**  [0.77] [0.01]***  [0.55] [0.41] 
GROWTH_3_S  -0.002 0.000  0.006 0.000  0.000 0.000 
  [0.29] [.]  [0.04]** [.]  [0.85] [.] 
SOLIDARITY  0.500 0.186 0.162    0.873 0.735 0.745 
 [0.61] [0.85] [0.87]    [0.19] [0.28] [0.27] 
VILLAGE BANKS 1.815 1.610 1.451    0.982 0.852 0.811 
 [0.08]* [0.13] [0.17]    [0.17] [0.24] [0.26] 
IS 1.430 1.337 1.337    0.879 0.829 0.846 
 [0.03]** [0.04]** [0.04]**    [0.06]* [0.07]* [0.07]* 
ONLYMM    1.227 1.242 1.331    
    [0.04]** [0.03]** [0.02]**    
Licensed    8.828 8.538 7.777    
    [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]***    
LS/GNI -0.002 -0.011 -0.013 -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 -0.016 -0.018 -0.018 
 [0.88] [0.51] [0.44] [0.61] [0.35] [0.36] [0.16] [0.12] [0.10] 
LS/GNI_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.41] [0.24] [0.19] [0.94] [0.75] [0.83] [0.09]* [0.07]* [0.05]* 
GLP_M 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.005 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.006 
 [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.04]** [0.66] [0.47] [0.85] [0.16] [0.18] [0.21] 
GLP_M_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.08]* [0.07]* [0.10] [0.84] [0.65] [0.99] [0.25] [0.27] [0.32] 
AGE -3.222 -3.459 -3.430 -1.080 -0.661 -0.786 -0.990 -1.032 -1.085 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.31] [0.54] [0.46] [0.09]* [0.08]* [0.06]* 
PRODUCTIVITY -0.014 -0.016 -0.017 -0.031 -0.032 -0.033 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 
 [0.17] [0.12] [0.09]* [0.02]** [0.01]** [0.01]*** [0.26] [0.24] [0.21] 
PRODUCTIVITY_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.18] [0.12] [0.09]* [0.07]* [0.05]* [0.04]** [0.34] [0.31] [0.26] 
OE/GLP -0.021 -0.032 -0.044 -0.042 -0.048 -0.054 -0.016 -0.018 -0.024 
 [0.54] [0.34] [0.20] [0.10]* [0.05]* [0.03]** [0.49] [0.45] [0.30] 
OE/GLP_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.10]* [0.19] [0.26] [0.80] [0.65] [0.51] [0.79] [0.90] [0.98] 
GLP/ASSETS 0.095 0.086 0.088 -0.128 -0.132 -0.156 0.055 0.053 0.049 
 [0.29] [0.33] [0.32] [0.19] [0.18] [0.11] [0.37] [0.39] [0.42] 
GLP/ASSETS_S -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.32] [0.40] [0.37] [0.17] [0.16] [0.11] [0.42] [0.46] [0.48] 
YIELD/GLP 0.023 0.036 0.031 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.033 0.036 0.036 
 [0.65] [0.48] [0.54] [0.83] [0.84] [0.84] [0.35] [0.31] [0.31] 
YIELD/GLP_2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.60] [0.75] [0.62] [0.79] [0.88] [0.88] [0.88] [0.84] [0.90] 
FD 0.060 0.055 0.053 0.025 0.012 0.015 0.021 0.017 0.020 
 [0.06]* [0.09]* [0.10]* [0.56] [0.79] [0.73] [0.35] [0.44] [0.38] 
LENDING RATE 0.001 -0.018 -0.008 0.016 0.027 0.035 0.008 0.002 0.005 
 [0.97] [0.58] [0.81] [0.69] [0.51] [0.36] [0.73] [0.91] [0.83] 
INFLATION 0.027 0.042 0.035 0.002 0.029 0.031 0.010 0.015 0.013 
 [0.32] [0.13] [0.20] [0.96] [0.34] [0.29] [0.60] [0.43] [0.49] 
Constant 4.177 5.837 6.398 9.652 9.354 10.960 0.960 1.320 1.765 
 [0.33] [0.17] [0.13] [0.03]** [0.04]** [0.01]** [0.74] [0.65] [0.54] 
Observations 887 887 887 1303 1303 1303 887 887 887 
Number of id 340 340 340 477 477 477 340 340 340 
R2_O 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
R2_W 11% 14% 13% 9% 11% 9% 5% 6% 5% 
R2_B 1% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 3% 3% 2% 
Chi2 58.02 62.75 52.52 35.50 49.03 37.00 43.61 39.16 45.17 
Prob>Chi2 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
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Table 7: Dependent Variables: LLR and WOR.  Fixed Effects 
 LLR WOR 
Specification 1 2 3 1 2 3 
SUSTAINABLE -0.566 -0.551 -0.573 -0.612 -0.592 -0.618 
 [0.08]* [0.09]* [0.07]* [0.06]* [0.07]* [0.06]* 
LAGGROWTH -0.022   -0.022   
 [0.34]   [0.35]   
LAGGROWTH_S 0.001   0.001   
 [0.29]   [0.33]   
LAGGROWTH_1  -0.065 -0.011  -0.074 -0.015 
  [0.16] [0.73]  [0.12] [0.64] 
LAGGROWTH_1_S  0.004 0.000  0.004 0.000 
  [0.10] [.]  [0.09]* [.] 
LAGGROWTH_2  0.000 0.003  0.004 0.006 
  [0.99] [0.90]  [0.91] [0.80] 
LAGGROWTH_2_S  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
  [0.78] [.]  [0.82] [.] 
LAGGROWTH_3  -0.018 -0.014  -0.015 -0.018 
  [0.65] [0.58]  [0.72] [0.49] 
LAGGROWTH_3_S  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
  [0.84] [.]  [0.98] [.] 
SOLIDARITY  -0.644 -0.727 -0.598 -0.549 -0.637 -0.511 
 [0.45] [0.40] [0.48] [0.53] [0.47] [0.56] 
VILLAGE BANKS 0.121 -0.004 0.130 0.061 -0.086 0.056 
 [0.89] [1.00] [0.89] [0.95] [0.93] [0.95] 
IS 0.716 0.658 0.732 0.612 0.545 0.624 
 [0.22] [0.26] [0.21] [0.30] [0.36] [0.30] 
LS/GNI -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 
 [0.90] [0.92] [0.82] [0.86] [0.83] [0.91] 
LS/GNI_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.49] [0.49] [0.43] [0.72] [0.73] [0.67] 
GLP_M 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 [0.26] [0.28] [0.28] [0.28] [0.30] [0.29] 
GLP_M_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.30] [0.31] [0.31] [0.33] [0.33] [0.33] 
AGE 0.819 0.880 0.861 1.388 1.459 1.441 
 [0.26] [0.23] [0.24] [0.06]* [0.05]* [0.05]* 
PRODUCTIVITY -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
 [0.85] [0.88] [0.85] [0.78] [0.84] [0.81] 
PRODUCTIVITY_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.78] [0.83] [0.78] [0.75] [0.82] [0.76] 
OE/GLP 0.010 0.014 0.010 0.028 0.032 0.028 
 [0.72] [0.64] [0.75] [0.35] [0.30] [0.37] 
OE/GLP_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.81] [0.89] [0.81] [0.88] [0.79] [0.86] 
GLP/ASSETS -0.111 -0.115 -0.112 -0.129 -0.135 -0.132 
 [0.16] [0.14] [0.15] [0.11] [0.09]* [0.10]* 
GLP/ASSETS_S 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.27] [0.25] [0.27] [0.20] [0.17] [0.19] 
YIELD/GLP -0.013 -0.018 -0.017 0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
 [0.77] [0.69] [0.70] [0.95] [0.94] [0.97] 
YIELD/GLP_2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.61] [0.53] [0.52] [0.81] [0.70] [0.71] 
FD 0.001 0.001 0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.006 
 [0.98] [0.97] [0.80] [0.98] [1.00] [0.84] 
LENDING RATE 0.008 0.010 0.007 -0.003 0.000 -0.002 
 [0.79] [0.73] [0.80] [0.92] [1.00] [0.94] 
INFLATION -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.012 0.011 
 [0.97] [0.94] [0.87] [0.79] [0.66] [0.65] 
Constant 4.798 4.730 4.688 3.813 3.746 3.675 
 [0.19] [0.20] [0.21] [0.31] [0.32] [0.33] 
Observations 887 887 887 887 887 887 
Number of id 340 340 340 340 340 340 
R2_O 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 4% 
R2_W 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6% 
R2_B 4% 4% 6% 4% 4% 6% 
Chi2 23.380 25.920 15.770 25.360 29.290 18.360 
Prob>Chi2 10% 17% 54% 6% 8% 37% 
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Table 8: Dependent Variables: PAR-30 and PAR-90.  Random Effects 
Specification 1 2 3 1 2 3 
SUSTAINABLE -1.021 -1.016 -1.012 -1.051 -1.042 -1.040 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
LAGGROWTH -0.004   -0.004   
 [0.83]   [0.85]   
LAGGROWTH_S 0.000   -0.001   
 [0.65]   [0.57]   
LAGGROWTH_1  -0.032 -0.016  -0.030 -0.015 
  [0.44] [0.53]  [0.47] [0.56] 
LAGGROWTH_1_S  0.001   0.001  
  [0.65]   [0.69]  
LAGGROWTH_2  0.011 -0.005  0.008 -0.006 
  [0.73] [0.78]  [0.80] [0.78] 
LAGGROWTH_2_S  -0.001   -0.001  
  [0.50]   [0.55]  
LAGGROWTH_3  -0.002 -0.015  0.002 -0.019 
  [0.94] [0.48]  [0.96] [0.37] 
LAGGROWTH_3_S  -0.001   -0.001  
  [0.65]   [0.46]  
SOLIDARITY -1.561 -1.586 -1.547 -1.376 -1.400 -1.368 
 [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.01]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.04]** 
VILLAGE BANKS -1.394 -1.428 -1.372 -1.393 -1.426 -1.371 
 [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** [0.03]** 
IS 0.396 0.386 0.403 0.483 0.472 0.488 
 [0.33] [0.34] [0.32] [0.25] [0.26] [0.24] 
LS/GNI -0.015 -0.014 -0.014 -0.014 -0.013 -0.013 
 [0.11] [0.13] [0.14] [0.13] [0.17] [0.20] 
LS/GNI_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.15] [0.16] [0.18] [0.12] [0.15] [0.16] 
GLP_M -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.87] [0.90] [0.88] [0.93] [0.90] [0.92] 
GLP_M_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.95] [1.00] [0.96] [0.88] [0.83] [0.86] 
AGE 0.802 0.798 0.804 1.060 1.054 1.066 
 [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.02]** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** 
PRODUCTIVITY -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 
 [0.38] [0.40] [0.42] [0.35] [0.38] [0.39] 
PRODUCTIVITY_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.66] [0.69] [0.71] [0.63] [0.68] [0.69] 
OE/GLP 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.017 0.017 
 [0.89] [0.84] [0.84] [0.54] [0.49] [0.48] 
OE/GLP_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.73] [0.79] [0.77] [0.92] [0.99] [0.98] 
GLP/ASSETS -0.094 -0.096 -0.094 -0.106 -0.109 -0.106 
 [0.13] [0.13] [0.13] [0.10] [0.09]* [0.10] 
GLP/ASSETS_S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 [0.31] [0.30] [0.31] [0.23] [0.22] [0.23] 
YIELD/GLP -0.045 -0.048 -0.045 -0.046 -0.050 -0.047 
 [0.19] [0.17] [0.19] [0.19] [0.16] [0.19] 
YIELD/GLP_2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.18] [0.15] [0.17] [0.19] [0.16] [0.19] 
FD 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.016 0.015 
 [0.21] [0.19] [0.22] [0.22] [0.20] [0.23] 
LENDING RATE -0.020 -0.019 -0.018 -0.030 -0.029 -0.027 
 [0.32] [0.35] [0.37] [0.16] [0.17] [0.20] 
INFLATION 0.011 0.013 0.008 0.017 0.020 0.013 
 [0.60] [0.57] [0.69] [0.45] [0.39] [0.54] 
R_EAP -0.555 -0.514 -0.472 -0.425 -0.381 -0.324 
 [0.53] [0.57] [0.60] [0.65] [0.68] [0.73] 
R_EECA -0.908 -0.907 -0.970 -0.332 -0.317 -0.399 
 [0.29] [0.29] [0.26] [0.71] [0.72] [0.66] 
R_LAC -0.191 -0.187 -0.150 0.195 0.199 0.241 
 [0.81] [0.81] [0.85] [0.81] [0.81] [0.77] 
R_MENA -2.587 -2.617 -2.488 -2.349 -2.370 -2.215 
 [0.09]* [0.09]* [0.11] [0.14] [0.14] [0.17] 
R_SASIA 0.556 0.598 0.659 0.792 0.822 0.907 
 [0.61] [0.59] [0.55] [0.49] [0.47] [0.43] 
Constant 8.108 8.120 7.934 7.725 7.735 7.474 
 [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.00]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** [0.01]*** 
R2_O 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 11% 
R2_W 4% 4% 4% 4% 5% 4% 
R2_B 17% 17% 17% 17% 17% 16% 
 
